Participation and Participation Rights in EU Law and Governance by Mendes, Joana
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492308 
 257
10.  Participation and participation 
rights in EU law and governance
Joana Mendes*1
1.  INTRODUCTION
Participation is ubiquitous in EU law and governance. Participatory 
phases are found in decisional procedures defi ned in many regulations and 
directives, be these an obligation impinging upon Member States, be they 
a procedural duty of EU administrative bodies, either determined by the 
EU legislator or self-imposed. Participation can, therefore, be seen as a 
dominant feature of the governance arrangements which have developed 
over the last decades.12
However, since participation has manifold meanings, the extent of this 
pervasion may be deceptive. This is the case if one intends participation as 
the procedural intervention of natural and legal persons whose substantive 
rights and interests are potentially aff ected by a Community regulatory 
measure, with a view both to ensuring the procedural protection of those 
rights and interests and to attaining an accurate representation of the 
factual situation based on an exact representation and consideration of the 
interests involved on the part of the deciding body.
This chapter argues that there is a mismatch between, on the one 
hand, the powers exerted by the European administration, particularly 
taking into account the eff ects which they may have in the legal sphere of 
persons concerned, and, on the other, the procedural guarantees which are 
aff orded to them under the right to be heard as this has been developed by 
the Community Courts. Considered the core of the rights of the defence, 
the right to be heard, as it has been shaped by the Courts is a tributary of 
an adversarial, bilateral conception of the procedure, and is thus primarily 
recognised to addressees of unfavourable administrative decisions, and, 
* This chapter is based on the doctoral research I am developing at the 
European University Institute, under the supervision of Professor Jacques Ziller.
1 Joanne Scott and David Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches 
to Governance in the European Union’, [2002] European Law Journal 1, at 5.
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more broadly, to those directly and individually concerned by them. As 
such, the procedural protection of persons aff ected by European adminis-
trative action is also limited to procedures leading to the adoption of indi-
vidual decisions. It will be shown that the subjective and objective limits 
thus placed on participation rights are not only unsuited to the procedural 
protection of holders of legitimate interests aff ected by European admin-
istrative action, but are also unjustifi able in the light of the rationales of 
participation defended by the European Courts (ECJ and CFI).
The argument will be developed as follows. In the fi rst section, the 
various usages of the concept in diff erent contexts of EU law and govern-
ance will be illustrated, on the basis of a brief account of the meanings 
of participation. This will illustrate that a ‘thicker’ meaning of participa-
tion, capable of grounding procedural guarantees to persons aff ected in 
their legal spheres by European regulatory measures, is virtually absent 
from the EU governing and administrative structures, as shaped by the 
Commission’s governance initiatives. At the same time, the narrower 
legal approach to participation, which can be seen in the Court’s juris-
prudence, is excessively restrictive for this purpose, for the reasons briefl y 
presented above. These reasons will be developed in the second part of the 
chapter, where the limits to the Court’s approach to participation rights 
will be highlighted. Finally, the third section will examine the criteria that, 
drawing on the concept of participation propounded above, may guide 
the recognition of participation rights in a way that is more consonant 
with the breadth of EU regulatory powers and with the complexity of the 
administrative relationships that emerge thereupon.
2.  THE PLURAL FACETS OF PARTICIPATION
Participation, in its simplest and most general form, can be described as 
the opportunity to take part in decision-making processes.21 In this broad 
sense, it comprises both the participation of public entities in decision-
making processes which are attributed to the competence2 of a diff erent 
entity or administration, on the one hand, and the involvement of the 
public or of interest holders in the exercise of public functions, on the 
other. The former phenomenon is particularly frequent in complex, multi-
layered administrative systems and stems from the need to ensure admin-
istrative collaboration among diff erent services and diff erent levels of 
2 This fi rst approach is often present in writings on participation. Among 
others, Mario Chiti, Partecipazione popolare e pubblica amministrazione, Pacini 
Editore (Pisa, 1977), pp. 34–35.
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administration, or, more strictly, to respect the allocation of competences 
among them when they are implicated in a given decision. The latter is the 
subject of this chapter.3 In this latter sense, it is possible analytically to 
distinguish multiple meanings of participation, according to the rationales 
underlying the intervention of private parties. In reality, these are often 
intertwined and it is not always easy to isolate one from the other.
Firstly, participation may be grounded on the need to gather informa-
tion on the factual situation which will be decided upon. Administrations 
have limited resources, at least in the face of the technical complexity 
implied in regulatory options. Regulatees are often better placed to 
provide the information needed for decision-making, without prejudice 
to other sources which the decisional body may resort to. Secondly, 
participation may be a means of ensuring the responsiveness of regula-
tory decisions. Calling interested parties to intervene in decisional proce-
dures and, eventually, to infl uence regulatory outcomes arguably allows 
enacted rules to be more in tune with to the social and economic needs of 
the regulated sector. Thirdly, the intervention of interested parties prior 
to the adoption of the fi nal decision arguably favours compliance and 
facilitates implementation. Having been able to take part in the decisional 
process and, possibly, to have their views refl ected or attended to in the 
fi nal act or to understand the reasons why this was not the case enhances 
adherence to the regulatory option of the decisional body and, thus, abid-
ance. In these three senses, participation is instrumental to the eff ective-
ness of decision-making. In so far as the intervention in the procedure of 
parties external to the institutionalised decisional structure is directed at 
facilitating the fulfi lment of the decisional function, participation assumes 
in these three cases a function of collaboration with the decision maker. 
Ultimately, it may be superseded by other regulatory techniques which 
ensure the same goals.4
A fourth, stronger, meaning of participation is grounded on ensuring 
respect for the dignity of the persons aff ected by regulatory decisions. 
Participation, in this sense, is grounded on the ‘moral imperative’ of 
allowing the persons concerned to defend their subjective rights and 
3 Although the participation of public entities in decisional procedures has, in 
general, diff erent rationales from the participation of private persons, these two 
phenomena can be equated in certain cases. For example, the procedural interven-
tion of a public entity in order to respect its attributed competences is, in a way, 
similar to the participation of private persons ensured to respect the public inter-
ference in their legal spheres.
4 Joined cases T–371/94 and T–394/94, British Airways and Others v. Commission 
[1998] ECR II–2405, paras. 60 and 64.
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interests before the adoption of a decision which may negatively impact 
on their legal sphere (audi alteram partem). Finally, participation can 
be understood as a tool for ‘public-making’,5 enhancing democracy by 
promoting ‘active citizenship’ through complementary means to those 
typical of democratic representation. The ‘public’, ‘the civil society’ or 
‘the citizens’ (without any further qualifi cation which restricts access 
to the procedure) are called upon to intervene in regulatory proc-
esses, and this is perceived as a means of creating an active public, or, 
at least, of avoiding public disaff ection with political institutions. A 
weaker manifestation of this meaning may be identifi ed in participa-
tory mechanisms primarily directed at ensuring the transparency of 
decisional processes.
2.1.  Participation in EU Governing and Administrative Structures
These diff erent meanings permeate the EU governing and administra-
tive structures. The consultative committees defi ned in the Treaty reveal 
the concern to involve interested parties in the Community rulemaking 
activity, arguably due to the instrumental reasons of responsiveness and 
compliance. Beyond the activity of these committees, the collaboration 
of persons concerned by Community regulatory activity in the form of 
their procedural intervention in decisional processes is a longstanding 
and entrenched feature of Community decisional structures. This is due 
not only to a fairly reduced administrative apparatus when compared 
to the tasks that the Community performs,6 but also to the need, felt 
in particular by the Commission, to create a proper constituency, in the 
line of the neo-functionalist trend dominant during the fi rst period of 
integration.7
The practice by the Commission of consulting national administrations, 
private experts and interest groups, both when defi ning the contours of 
Community policies and when delineating the practical conditions of 
5 This expression was suggested by Professor Neil Walker (recognising the lack 
of a more adequate term) in a discussion I had with him on participation. I thank 
him for clarifi cations on the systematisation I present in this section.
6 The relationship between a reduced administrative apparatus and resort to 
collaboration of concerned parties is explicit in the Treaty which established the 
European Coal and Steel Community. Indeed, Article 5, while defi ning in broad 
terms the competences of the Community, determined that these were to be carried 
out by the institutions ‘with a minimum of administrative machinery and in close 
co-operation with the parties concerned’ (emphasis added).
7 Justin Greenwood, Interest Representation in the European Union, Palgrave 
Macmillan (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 4.
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application for those policies, is well-known.8 This practice has given rise 
to the creation of diverse committees, among which interest committees 
composed of representatives from the social and economic sectors con-
cerned set up to ensure their input in decision-making (for example, the 
advisory groups dealing with matters covered by the common agricultural 
policy).9 In some cases, representatives from interest groups take part in 
comitology committees’ discussions and negotiations, contrary to what 
is statutorily defi ned.10 More broadly, the Commission often resorts to 
various forms of consultation in order to gather technical information and 
to ensure the responsiveness of its regulatory policies (for example publi-
cation of consultative documents, such as green and white papers, internet 
consultations and hearings of specifi c groups through workshops, confer-
ences or seminars). Often, the legislator defi nes the consultation duties 
impinging directly on Community administrative bodies.
The intent to seek the collaboration of interested parties and the one 
to open up decisional procedures in order to ensure transparency and 
the adherence of specifi c publics often converge in these consultation 
mechanisms and duties. In some cases, however, it is possible to isolate 
one of the two meanings as the prevailing rationale for participation. So, 
for example, the public inquiry period regarding the scientifi c opinion of 
the European Food and Safety Authority envisaged for the authorisation, 
modifi cation, suspension and revocation of the marketing authorisa-
tions of genetically modifi ed food and feed (in line with the principles 
defi ned in the general food safety regulation) is destined to ensure the 
transparency of these procedures and thereby to tackle the risk of public 
mistrust regarding Community decisions. Two arguments support this 
 8 For an early account, Emil Noël, ‘Comment fonctionnent les institutions de 
la Communauté Économique Européenne’ [1963] Revue du Marché Commun 14, 
at p. 20.
 9 Dating back to the 1960’s, they are now regulated by Decision 2004/391/EC 
of 23 April 2004, OJ (2004) L 120/50.
10 Peter van der Knaap, ‘Government by Committee: Legal Typology, 
Quantitative Assessment and Institutional Repercussions of Committees in 
the European Union’, in Robin H. Pedler and Günther F. Schaefer, Shaping 
European Law and Policy. The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political 
Process, European Institute of Public Administration (Maastricht, 1996) pp. 83, 
at p. 101. Annette Töller, ‘The “Article 19 Committee”: the Regulation of the 
Environmental Management and Audit Scheme’, in M.P.C.M van Schendelen 
(ed.), EU Committees as Infl uential Policymakers Ashgate (Aldershot, 1998) pp. 
179, at p. 181–182. No mention of this practice is found in the Report from the 
Commission on the working of committees during 2005 (COM(2006)446 fi nal, 
Brussels, 9 August 2006), which unsurprisingly is confi ned to the formal function-
ing of the comitology committees.
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interpretation: fi rst, the fact that no particular connection to the subject 
matter is required to access the procedure – comments are received from 
‘the public’ in general – and, secondly, the fact one of the regulatory 
concerns in this sector is to ensure consumer confi dence in the decision-
making processes underpinning food law.11 A diff erent rationale grounds 
the consultation of interested parties ‘regarding the form in which applica-
tions for authorisation [of medicinal products] are to be presented’ as well 
as the drafting of the structure and level of fees paid by undertakings to 
obtain and maintain Community marketing authorisations, envisaged in 
the legal regime for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal prod-
ucts. This consultation is arguably grounded on the need to secure the 
collaboration of persons concerned in the defi nition and implementation 
of these rules.12
In a diff erent way, giving rise to distinct types of decision-making, some 
participation practices have mutated into forms of involvement of private 
persons in decisional processes where they acquire formal decisional 
powers – the 1985 ‘new approach to harmonisation’ is but one example – 
or negotiating powers – a diff erent technique of involvement of concerned 
parties which can be exemplifi ed by the partnership principle in the man-
agement of structural funds.13
Taking into account its pervasiveness across policy sectors, one may 
claim that participation is an inbuilt and refl exive feature of the European 
polity. Participation in this context is essentially intended as a means of 
enhancing the decisional function and its regulatory eff ects (in the triple 
11 Articles 9 (7), 10 (1), 18 (7) and 22 (1) of Regulation 1829/2003, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, of 22 September 2003, on genetically 
modifi ed food and feed OJ (2003) L 268/1. Also Article 9 of recital 5 and 9 and 22 
of the preamble to Regulation 178/2002, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, of 28 January 2002, laying down the general principles and requirements 
of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety OJ (2002) L 31/1.
12 Articles 6(4) and 70(1) of Regulation 726/2004, of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, of 31 March 2004, laying down Community procedures for the 
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use 
and establishing a European Medicines Agency OJ (2004) L 136/1.
13 Now enshrined in Article 11 of Council Regulation 1083/2006, of 11 July 
2006, laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1260/1999, OJ (2006) L 210/25. On the distinction between non-decisional 
participation and these various forms of public–private regulation, see Fabrizio 
Cafaggi, ‘Rethinking Private Regulation in the European regulatory space’, in 
Fabrizio Cafaggi (ed.), Reframing Self-regulation in European Private Law, Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, (2006) p. 3, at pp. 22–35.
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meaning mentioned above) but it is also pervaded by a sense of reaching 
out to specifi c publics. Recent normative developments have furthered its 
instrumental use and, at least in appearance and in certain contexts, have 
imbued participation with a fully-fl edged connotation of ‘public-making’. 
The 2001 White Paper on Governance is a conspicuous example of this 
blend of meanings of participation. There, most notably, participation is 
dressed up by the rhetoric of ‘[connecting] Europe closer to its citizens’.14 
Nevertheless, the ‘principle of participation’ as adopted in the White 
Paper essentially perpetuated former practices of consultation and inter-
est representation which were eventually retouched and better structured 
due to the Commission’s search for social legitimacy.15 At the same time, 
the wording of the principle of participatory democracy, fi rst enshrined in 
the Constitutional Treaty and now in the Lisbon Treaty, represents little 
more than a crystallisation of the abovementioned practices.16 Concretely, 
among other developments, consultation became one of the pillars of the 
Commission’s strategy of better law-making, inserted into procedures 
of impact assessment.17 Moreover, specifi c regulatory approaches have 
been developed where the involvement of concerned parties is of central 
relevance (for example, the Lamfalussy regulatory approach in the fi eld of 
fi nancial services, where involvement of market practitioners is destined 
14 Commission of the European Communities, ‘European Governance. A 
White Paper’, COM(2001)428 fi nal, Brussels, 25 July 2001, p. 8.
15 The claimed principle of participation is formulated thus: ‘[t]he quality, 
relevance and eff ectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation 
throughout the policy chain – from conception to implementation. Improved 
participation is likely create more confi dence in the end result and in the (i)
nstitutions which deliver policies. Participation crucially depends on central gov-
ernments following an inclusive approach when developing and implementing 
EU policies’: White Paper, cit. (n.14), p. 10.) On this, Kenneth A. Armstrong, 
‘Rediscovering Civil Society: the European Union and the White Paper on 
Governance’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 102; Paul Magnette, ‘European 
Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?’ (2003) 51 
Political Studies 144.
16 Future Article 8B(1) to (3) of the EU Treaty, following amendment by 
Treaty of Lisbon, OJ (2007) C 306/1. Article I–47(1) to (3) of the Treaty establish-
ing a Constitution for Europe, OJ (2004) C 310/1.
17 Communication from the Commission, ‘European Governance: Better 
Lawmaking’, COM(2002)275 fi nal, Brussels, 5 June 2002, p. 3; Communication 
from the Commission, ‘Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue 
– General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties 
by the Commission’, COM(2002) 704 fi nal, Brussels, 11 December 2002, p. 15. 
Highlighting the limited scope of application of these principles and standards, 
Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2006) p. 
135.
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to ensure inclusiveness and acceptance, as well as better rulemaking18). 
However, the thicker meaning of participation, underpinned in respect 
for the dignity of the person, capable of ensuring procedural protection 
to persons aff ected by regulatory measures, is virtually absent from these 
developments.
2.2.  Participation in the Case Law of the EU Courts
The stricter legal approach to participation contained in the case law of 
the EU Courts reveals a narrower picture than the one depicted above. 
Participation assumed in this context the form of a right to be heard, 
recognised ‘in all proceedings initiated against a person which are liable 
to culminate in a measure adversely aff ecting that person’ and considered 
‘a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed 
even in the absence of any rules governing the procedure in question’.19 
Arguably, the core justifying criterion for applying the audi alteram 
partem principle lies in the adverse eff ect that an administrative decision 
may have vis-à-vis individual parties,20 which corresponds to the fourth 
meaning of participation outlined above. Participation has the function 
of defence, aff ording anticipated procedural protection to aff ected inter-
ests, and it is thus seen as a complement to judicial review, as the partici-
pant is able to contradict the possible future decision, invoking errors, 
fl aws or mistakes which might lead to the illegality of the fi nal act.21 The 
intervention of the person targeted by the administrative procedure is 
grounded on a principle of justice. It is a formality required by the rule 
of law, being typical of individual procedures from which sanctions or 
18 ‘Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Market’, Brussels, 15 February 2001, pp. 32–33 (available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/fi nal-
report-wise-men_en.pdf). See also Article 5 of Commission Decision 2001/527/EC, 
of 6 June 2001, establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, 
OJ (2001) L 191/43, amended by Commission Decision 2004/7/EC of 5 November 
2003, OJ (2001) L 3/32.
19 For example, Case 234/84, Belgium v. Commission [1986] ECR 2263, para. 
27; Case C–135/92, Fiskano v. Commission [1994] ECR I–2885, para. 39; Case 
T–260/94, Air Inter v. Commission [1997] ECR II–997, para. 59.
20 Hanns Peter Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law, Hart 
Publishing (Oxford, 1999), pp. 71 and 84.
21 Referring to Italian administrative law, but of general relevance, Massimo 
Occhiena, ‘Partecipazione al procedimento amministrativo’, in Sabino Cassese 
(ed.), Dizionario di Diritto Pubblico, Giuff rè (Milan, 2006), vol. V, p. 4128, at p. 
4134.
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penalties may emerge or in which a potential advantageous position is 
denied to an applicant.22
However, the right to be heard also emerges in the Courts’ jurispru-
dence as an objective procedural standard which structures the exercise 
of administrative powers, be it because it ensures the position of aff ected 
private parties, be it because it enables the administrative authority to cor-
rectly assess the factual situation which it is called upon to appreciate. In 
this sense, the rationale of the right to be heard lies in a principle of care, 
according to which the administrative authorities should carry out a scru-
pulous examination of the facts and take into account all their possible 
facets, parallel to the second meaning of participation indicated above.23 
The stance according to which an infringement of the right to be heard can 
only lead to the annulment of the decision on procedural grounds if the 
applicant challenging the validity of the ‘irregular’ decision can prove that 
this would have been diff erent otherwise converges with this interpretation, 
as it enhances the objective side of the right to be heard.24 This dualism – 
participation grounded on the dignity of the person and participation as 
a factor which contributes to the correct exercise of the  administrative 
22 This stance underlined judgments such as the ones issued in Case 17/74, 
Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission [1974] ECR, 1063, at paras 
15 and 16; in Case 85/76, Hoff mann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission [1979] 
ECR 461, at paras 9 and 15; in Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst AG v. 
Commission [1989] ECR 2859; at paras 13 to 15 and 52; Case C–49/88, Al-Jubail 
Fertilizer Company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (Safco) v. 
Council [1991] ECR I–3187, at paras 15 to 18; as well as in Case T–450/93, Lisrestal 
– Organização Gestão de Restaurantes Colectivos Ldª and others v. Commission 
[1994] ECR II–1177, at paras 42, 45, 47 and 48 and in Case C-32/95 P, Commission 
v. Lisrestal – Organização Gestão de Restaurantes Colectivos Ldª and others [1996] 
ECR I–5373, at paras 24, 26 to 30 and 33.
23 Cf., for example, Case 34/77, Jozef Oslizlok v. Commission [1978] ECR 1099, 
at para. 18, or, more noticeably, Case C–269/90, Technische Universität München 
v. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] ECR I–5469, at paras 13, 14 and, especially, 
24. The Court has extended procedural protection of concerned parties on the 
basis of the principle of care, which it clearly separates from the right to be heard 
(in Case T–167/94, Detlef Nölle v. Council and Commission [1995] ECR II–2589, 
paras 63 and 78; see next section, below). On this, Nehl, cit. (n.20), Chapter 9.
24 The Court has not been consistent in this point. Tridimas considers that the 
stance referred to in the text is the dominant one (Takis Tridimas, The General 
Principles of EU Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2006), pp. 
391 and 392. Nehl points out cases where the Court adopted a diff erent stance, but 
underlines the limitations of withdrawing consequences from this development: 
cit. (n.20), pp. 97–98. For an intermediate stance, closer to the latter, see Case 
T–147/97, Champion Stationery Mfg Co. Ltd and others v. Council [1998] ECR 
II–4137, para. 79 and Case C–194/99, Thyssen Stahl v. Commission [2003] ECR 
I–10821, para. 31.
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function – has accompanied the  jurisprudential  developments in this 
matter.25
3.  LIMITS TO PARTICIPATION RIGHTS IN EU LAW
The Courts have maintained a pragmatic approach to participation, 
refraining from constructing a consistent doctrinal basis for the right to 
be heard. Although it is possible to identify situations where the right will 
be granted more likely than not,26 outside its core purview (adjudicatory, 
trial-type administrative procedures which may produce adverse eff ects in 
the legal sphere of the addressees of individual decisions) and the fi elds of 
law where it has been recognised, the fi nal conclusion remains dependent 
on the judicial appreciation of each case. In the end, the Courts’ possibly 
purposeful pragmatism leaves room to accommodate diff erent solutions.27 
This relative character of the right to be heard has been highlighted in 
Yusuf and Kadi, where the fundamental rights and the type of restriction at 
issue implied the need to comply with the rights of the defence of the indi-
viduals concerned, even if at only a subsequent phase of the procedure.28
Furthermore, two boundaries limit the permissible scope of rights 
of participation. First, the right to be heard has been chiefl y recog-
nised to legal or natural persons or public bodies targeted by admin-
istrative decisions, or to persons who are adversely aff ected by those 
decisions in a similar manner. The Courts’ jurisprudence has been 
25 Eric Barbier de La Serre, ‘Procedural Justice in the European Community 
Case-law Concerning the Rights of the Defence: Essentialist and Instrumentalist 
Trends’ (2006) 12 European Public Law 225, in particular pp. 228–229.
26 On this see ibid., p. 248.
27 See Nehl, cit., pp. 95 and 98, who is critical, and Barbier de La Serre, cit., pp. 
248–250, upholding this pragmatism with some reservations.
28 Case T–306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission [2005] ECR II–3533, at paras 326 and 327; Case T–315/01, 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II–3649, at paras 256 
and 257. Beyond the respect of the rights of the defence, these cases raise important 
questions pertaining, in particular, to the relations between Community and inter-
national law and the jurisdiction of Community Courts to review Community acts 
which implement resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. 
The judgments were controversial and these issues have been widely debated in 
the literature. Specifi cally on the right to be heard, see joined Cases C–402/05 P 
and C–415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v. Council and Commission [2008] nyr., para. 333 to 348, as well as Opinion of 
Advocate General Maduro, delivered on 16 January 2008 in Case C–402/05 P, 
Yassin Abdullah v. Council and Commission nyr., para 47 and 51 to 53.
M1808 - HOFMANN TEXT.indd   266 7/4/09   09:46:31
 Participation rights in EU law and governance  267
predominantly underpinned in an adversarial-adjudicative conception 
of process rights,29 and this has arguably limited the expansion of 
participation rights to the intervention of other interested parties.30 
Apart from the specifi c procedures where intervention of interested 
parties is expressly envisaged (for example, competition, anti-dumping, 
Community trademark),31 holders of legitimate interests and of general 
interests the closeness of which to the material relationship at issue 
could justify extended legal protection or the input of which could 
contribute to a sound decision may be denied legally protected and 
judicially enforceable participation rights.
There are, however, in the Court’s case law, indications which allow us 
to overcome this limitation. In some judgments, the Courts went beyond 
the strict formality of procedures, in particular the bilateral scheme of 
the relationship established between the deciding body and the person 
targeted by an administrative measure, and took into account the position 
which other private parties have in relation to the administrative decision. 
In Lisrestal, the Court recognised the right to be heard of the benefi ci-
ary of the European Social Fund, even though the benefi ciary was not 
the interlocutor of the Commission, on the grounds that he was directly 
concerned and adversely aff ected by a decision reducing the amount of the 
aid granted. The most signifi cant statement in this judgment is that the 
applicable regulation, determining the competence of the Commission to 
suspend, reduce or withdraw aid and to order the refund of paid amounts 
for which benefi ciaries have primary liability establishes a direct link 
29 The ‘trial-type-of-process’ origin of the right to be heard is well expressed by 
the use of the term ‘droits de la défense’ or ‘rights of the defence’, often used in the 
Courts’ jurisprudence. The infl uence of this judicial conception is equally shown 
in the reasoning of some judgments and in the reference to the need to ensure the 
right to be heard ‘in all procedures, even of administrative nature’ (Case 85/76, 
Hoff mann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, at para. 9; Joined cases 100 
to 103/80, SA Musique Diff usion française and others v. Commission [1983] ECR 
1825, at para. 10; Case T–11/89, Shell International Chemical Company Ltd v. 
Commission [1992] ECR II–757, at para. 39; Thyssen Stahl, cit. (n. 24), at para. 
30). It is, moreover, confi rmed by the wording frequently reiterated by the Courts: 
‘respect for the rights of the defence is, in all proceedings initiated against a person 
which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely aff ecting that person, a funda-
mental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed even in the absence 
of any rules governing the proceedings in question’ (e.g. Belgium v. Commission, 
cit. (n. 19), at para. 27; Fiskano, cit. (n. 19), at para. 39; Air Inter, cit. (n. 19), at 
para. 59; Yusuf, cit. (n. 28), at para. 325; Kadi, cit. (n. 28), 255).
30 Similarly to what may occur at national level. For the English case, Paul 
Craig, Administrative Law, 5th edition, Sweet and Maxwell (London 2003), p. 409.
31 See, below, section 4.2.
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between these and the Commission.32 In Nölle, the Court, faithful to a 
bilateral view of the administrative relationship, considered that no right 
to be heard could be recognised accorded to an independent importer in 
the realm of an anti-dumping procedure on the ground that this ‘was not 
against the applicant and could not for that reason result in a measure 
adversely aff ecting it’. However, the independent importer could access the 
procedure, on the grounds that it had demonstrated a ‘suffi  cient interest as 
an “interested party”’ for the purpose of taking part in the anti-dumping 
procedure. It follows that the Commission, in accordance with the princi-
ple of care, must ‘consider seriously and in detail whether [the] arguments 
or proposals [invoked by the interested party] are well founded’. The 
 principle of care is thus intended as ‘a rule protecting individuals’.33
A second limitation to participation rights pertains to the realm of 
acts to which the right to be heard is applicable. The Court has sustained 
that this right, intended as a general principle of law when exercised in 
individualised administrative procedures, cannot be transposed to the 
realm of general acts involving a choice of economic policy. The Court 
fi rst grounded this stance on the need to respect the Treaty determinations 
in relation to consultation as well as the democratic principles stemming 
from the Treaty (Atlanta). In subsequent judgments, however, this reason-
ing was extended to general acts adopted on the basis of a regulation or 
directive (for example, Bergaderm).34 Any possibility of legally enforced 
participation (and, hence, anticipated legal protection) in relation to a 
wide range of administrative regulatory acts is thus excluded, whenever 
rights of participation have not been expressly enshrined in a Treaty 
Article or in Community legislation, even when substantive rights and 
interests are eff ectively aff ected by general rules. The cases in which the 
Court has recognised the right to be heard in procedures leading to the 
adoption of general acts are clearly circumscribed – investigative proceed-
ings prior to the adoption of anti-dumping regulations, given the partially 
individualised nature of the latter (they are applicable to specifi c imported 
32 Lisrestal v. Commission, cit. (n. 22), paras 47 and 48 (see also paras 43 to 45), 
and Commission v. Lisrestal, cit. (n. 22), paras 28 and 29.
33 Nölle, cit. (n. 23), paras 63 and 78. For a sharp criticism of this judgment, 
Nehl, cit. (n. 20), pp. 76–7. Nehl notes that the scope of the principle of care in not 
clear, in particular it is not always easy to delimit it from the scope of the rights to 
be heard (cit., pp. 110–111, 131–132, 162–163).
34 Case T–521/93, Atlanta AG and others v. Council and Commission [1996] 
ECR II–1707, at paras 70–72; Case C–104/97 P, Atlanta AG and others v. 
Commission and Council [1999] ECR I–6983, at paras 37 and 38 (and, before, in 
Case T–199/96, Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques 
Goupil v. Commission [1998] ECR II–2805, at paras, 50, 58 and 59.)
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products and are thus susceptible to producing adverse consequences 
and aff ecting ‘directly and individually’ the undertakings concerned).35 In 
addition, the requirement of ‘direct and individual concern’, the condi-
tion for access to justice under Article 230 (4) EC, has been considered 
irrelevant for the purposes of access to rulemaking procedures.36 This 
stance may void the procedural protection of individuals in European law 
in cases where general rules tend to replace individual decisions as a form 
of regulation, but where the rules adopted may be suffi  ciently detailed to 
impact on individuals’ legitimate interests.37
Arguably, the connections between access to administrative procedures 
and access to justice have been a fundamental barrier to further juris-
prudential developments in this matter,38 especially as far as extending 
the procedural protection aff orded by rights of participation to persons 
other than those individually and directly concerned by a given act, and, 
thereby, to general and abstract acts (with the mentioned exception of 
anti-dumping regulations is concerned). Underlying the Courts’ stance is 
the assumption that sustaining participation in rulemaking procedures or 
expanding procedural rights beyond what is determined in the Treaty or in 
secondary legislation goes against the Courts’ powers under the Treaty.39 
35 Case C–49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian 
Fertilizer Company (Safco) v. Council of the European Communities [1991] 
ECR I–3187, para. 15. Opinion of AG Darmon delivered on 7 February 1991 
in Al-Jubail [1991] ECR I–3205, at paras 72 to 75), drawing on the Opinion of 
AG Warner delivered on 14 February 1979 in Case 113/77, NTN Toyo Bearing 
Company and others v. Council [1979] ECR 1212, p. 1262.
36 Case T–13/99, Pfi zer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] ECR II–3305, at 
paras 88–105 and 487, and Case T–70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. Council [2002] ECR 
II–3495, at paras 80–97 and 388.
37 On this, Craig, EU Administrative Law, cit. (n. 17), pp. 318–322.
38 These have been underlined by the Courts, for example, in Case C–198/91, 
William Cook plc v. Commission [1993] ECR I–2487, at para. 23; Case C–225/91, 
Matra v. Commission [1993] ECR I–3203, at para. 17). In Pfi zer and Alpharma, the 
reverse situation occurred: direct and individual concern was recognised to access 
judicial review, but considered unsuited to ground a right to be heard (see footnote 
37). The result is, however, the same: recognising a right to be heard in Pfi zer and 
Alpharma, when at stake was a procedure leading to the adoption of a regulation, 
would open Pandora’s box.
39 Atlanta (CFI judgment), at para. 71 and Atlanta (ECJ judgment), at para. 
38 (‘In the context of a procedure for the adoption of a Community act based 
on an article of the Treaty, the only obligations of consultation incumbent on 
the Community legislature are those laid down in the article in question’) and 
Case T–198/01, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v. Commission [2004] ECR 
II–2717, at para. 194 (‘the Community Court cannot, on the basis of the general 
legal principles relied on by the applicant, such as those of the right to due process, 
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In addition, the political implications of an expansion of participation, 
often emphasised by the Commission in its initiatives to ‘bring the citi-
zens closer to the European institutions’, have possibly prevented a more 
favourable jurisprudential stance in relation to participation rights.
However, this leads to a mismatch between the powers exercised by 
Community administrative bodies and the procedural protection of 
the persons concerned: the scope of procedural protection aff orded 
by Community rules and principles does not accompany the power to 
interfere in the person’s legal sphere. A food business operator may have 
charges and duties imposed on him without having had the opportunity to 
express his views in the corresponding procedure (the procedure that led 
to the decision imposing charges and duties), where the conditions for the 
use of the products he deals with are determined market by a regulation 
following a procedure initiated by another person.40 A consumer organi-
sation the input of which into decisional procedures is in principle looked 
upon favourably cannot claim a participation right on which to ground 
its procedural intervention and related claims.41 Further, in most cases 
where the Courts have extended participation or some of the related pro-
cedural guarantees to interested parties other than the person on whose 
sphere the administrative act directly impinges, they remain faithful to an 
adversarial conception of the administrative procedure which involves the 
administration and the person targeted by the administrative decision in a 
bilateral relationship, other persons being considered third parties to the 
proceedings.42 While this may be accurate in some situations, in others it 
the right to be heard, sound administration or equal treatment, extend the proce-
dural rights which the Treaty and secondary legislation confer on interested parties 
in procedures for reviewing State aid’).
40 Cf. procedure for the approval of smoke fl avourings used or intended for use 
in or on foods, ruled by Regulation 2065/2003, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, of 10 November 2003, OJ (2003) L 309/1, in particular Article 9 (4).
41 Case C-170/89, Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs v. Commission 
[1991] ECR I–5709, at paras 19–21.
42 Nölle, cit. (n. 20), at paras 63 and 76. Technische Glaswerke, cit. (n. 39), at 
paras 60 and 61. Even Lisrestal, despite the breakthrough, is still indebted to this 
conception (Lisrestal, cit. (n. 22), paras 43 and 45). Arguably, in Al-Jubail this 
conception is not so markedly dominant (given the hybrid nature of anti-dumping 
regulations). Yet, it is present in the formulation of the right to be heard: ‘[require-
ments stemming from the right to a fair hearing] must be observed not only in the 
course of proceedings which may result in the imposition of penalties, but also in 
investigative proceedings prior to the adoption of anti-dumping regulations which, 
despite their general scope, may directly and individually aff ect the undertakings 
concerned and entail adverse consequences for them’ at (para. 15, emphasis 
added).
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may be unsuited to properly representing the eff ective position of aff ected 
parties and, in current EU law, thus places them in an uncertain position 
regarding their procedural rights. In the fi eld of state aid, for example, 
only recently have the Courts issued judgments which ensure procedural 
guarantees to the parties concerned, who, not being the addressees of state 
aid decisions, are called upon to participate, under Article 88(2) EC, in the 
procedure assessing the compatibility of an aid with Community rules.43
On the other hand, stances favourable to the procedural protection of 
interested persons are unlikely to come about through the Commission’s 
practice: although this last welcomes sources of information and collabo-
ration in the exercise of its regulatory functions, it is not willing to follow 
legal rules which could enshrine procedural rights to persons aff ected by 
its activity.44 Without denying that there are costs associated with partici-
pation and that ensuring a ‘timely delivery of policy’ is a worthy aim, this 
stance may, in certain cases, infringe human dignity as a value underlying 
the right to participate in procedures aff ecting one’s rights and interests, 
for example, one’s professional reputation.45
The current rules on the right to be heard are is at odds with a paradigm 
of administrative law which propounds rules and principles developed to 
ensure the correct exercise of the administrative function in respect of the 
rights and legitimate interests of citizens. It may be argued that the EU, 
predominantly focused on the goals of economic integration, is essen-
tially output-oriented and that such a paradigm is either unsuited to EU 
administrative law or, at least, not inherent in the nature of the EU polity. 
43 In Technische Glaswerke, cit., the Court reviewed the motivation of the 
Commission’s decision in the light of its ability to allow ‘the applicant, as a party 
concerned, to understand why its argument had been rejected’ (para. 67; this was 
confi rmed in appeal: Case C–404/04 P, Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH v. 
Commission [2007] ECR I–1, at para. 35). In Kuwait, the Court held that ‘the 
Commission is obliged duly to place the interested parties in a position to put 
forward their comments in the course of a formal investigation procedure on State 
aid’: Case T–354/99, Kuwait Petroleum (Nederland) BV v. Commission [2006] ECR 
II–1475, at para. 83.
44 Communication from the Commission, ‘Towards a reinforced culture of 
consultation’, cit. (n. 17), pp. 10 and 15.
45 Case T–326/99, Nancy Fern Olivieri v. Commission [2003] ECR II–6053 
where the Court, sanctioning the Commission’s abovementioned stance, recog-
nised the utility of the appointment’s procedural intervention in a procedure for 
the approval of medicinal products, but denied her any guarantee which would 
enable her to assess how her contribution had been taken into account (paras 72 
to 74 and 91). As to whether her professional reputation had been harmed in the 
whole procedure, the Court simply concluded that the applicable regulation did 
not allow the Commission to take these considerations into account (para. 97).
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This argument is, however, weak. It ignores the features of EU law which 
place the individual and the protection of his rights at the core of the EU 
legal system, namely the doctrine of direct eff ect, the conception of fun-
damental rights as part of the general principles of EU law and European 
citizenship.46
Concomitantly, the status quo is problematic under the rule of law. It 
is submitted that, in a system respectful of the rule of law, the procedural 
protection of individuals and their legally protected interests aff ected by 
the exercise of the Union’s administrative power needs to be a central 
concern.47 The fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights recognises the 
rights of persons in their relationships with the European administration 
confi rms that this aspect is not fully neglected by EU law. Nevertheless, 
46 The ‘motivations’ or, possibly, claimed limitations of these features in secur-
ing the position of the individual in EC law do not override this statement. Direct 
eff ect has been instrumental in ensuring the eff ectiveness of EU law (Francis G. 
Jacobs, ‘The Evolution of the European Legal Order’ (2004) Common Market Law 
Review vol. 41, Issue 2, 303, at p. 308), as European citizenship may be considered 
as a tool for intensifying the process of integration and modest in view of the rights 
and duties of which it is composed (see Ulrich K. Preuss, ‘The Relevance of the 
Concept of Citizenship for the Political and Constitutional Development of the 
EU’, in Ulrich K. Preuss and Ferran Requejo Coll (eds), European Citizenship, 
Multiculturalism, and the State, Nomos (Baden-Baden, 1998) p. 11, at pp. 14–15). 
As to fundamental rights, it may be argued that the claims based on their violation 
have been weak in leading to the annulment of legislative acts, and, in addition, 
that the EU ‘continues to be a weak actor as far as the promotion of human rights 
is concerned’, apart from having double standards regarding its own members, 
on the one hand, and external actors, on the other (Paul Craig and Gráinne de 
Búrca, EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials, 4th edition, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford, 2008), pp. 390–391 and 407–408; the quotation is from p. 408). In any 
case, these features do have the eff ect of giving the individual a central position 
in EU law. Regarding direct eff ect see Bruno de Witte, ‘Direct Eff ect, Supremacy, 
and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1999), pp. 177–213, at pp. 
205–207). Despite the drawbacks pointed out, ‘a strong commitment to human 
rights is one of the principle characteristics of the European Union’ (Philip Alston 
and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘An “ever closer union” in Need of a Human Rights Policy: the 
European Union and Human Rights’, in P. Alston et al. (eds.) The EU and Human 
Rights, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1999), p. 6) and, admittedly, the status 
of European citizenship in itself entails the potential for reinforcing the position of 
the individual in the integration process (Preuss, cit., p. 25).
47 This concern is manifested in Case C–49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company 
(Samad) et Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (Safco) v. Council [1991] ECR 
I–3187, where the Court argued for a ‘scrupulous’ action of the Community 
institutions in view of the possibility that European rules might ‘not provide all 
the procedural guarantees for the protection of the individual which may exist in 
certain national legal systems’ (cit., para. 16).
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the corresponding provision, restating previous case law, suff ers from the 
defi ciencies pointed out above.48 Finally, in a regulatory system such as 
the Union’s, where the decision-making power is spread across diff erent 
levels connected under complex administrative procedures, one cannot 
rely for the purposes of procedural protection on the principle that partic-
ipation is a matter to be left to national rules. Participation needs to occur 
at the stage of the procedure where the decisions are formed, in order 
to preserve its eff et utile.49 In the light of what was argued above, this 
requires an extended procedural protection going beyond that aff orded 
by the recognition of the right to be heard as a fundamental principle of 
EU law.
4.  PARTICIPATION RIGHTS AND THE 
PROCEDURAL PROTECTION OF HOLDERS
OF LEGITIMATE INTERESTS
4.1.  Underpinning Participation Rights: Concept of
Participation
Participation should be intended in a broader sense than the strict for-
mulation of the right to be heard developed by the Community Courts. 
This is predominantly underpinned in a adversarial conception of the 
administrative procedure and arguably infl uenced by the requirement 
of individually and directly concerned persons, defi ned as a condition 
to access the judicial review of Community acts.50 A broader concept 
of participation is defi ned by reference to the persons whose interven-
tion is considered legally relevant and to the functions of this interven-
tion. On the one hand, the intervention of participants presupposes the 
entitlement of a substantive interest potentially aff ected by the outcome 
of the procedure. On the other, the legal relevance of the participants’ 
intervention in the procedure is assessed in the light of two combined 
functions of participation: procedural protection of aff ected legal spheres 
(participation grounded on the person’s dignity) and an accurate repre-
sentation of the factual situation (participation as a means of gathering 
information and facilitating implementation and compliance structures in 
48 Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ (2000) C364/1.
49 This has been recognised by the Courts (cf., e.g., Case T–346/94, France-
aviation v. Commission [1995] ECR II–2841, paras 30 and 34).
50 Article 230 (4) EC.
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the exercise of the decisional function).51 This combined criterion allows 
a stricter sense of procedural participation to be distinguished from the 
multiple meanings of participation and, particularly, from the somewhat 
disparate uses that especially the Commission has made of this concept 
in its governance initiatives. At the same time, the proposed criterion 
departs from the narrow judicial conception of participation rights: those 
aff ected are not necessarily directly and individually concerned and the 
acts covered by participation rights may be of a general nature as long 
as the conditions on which participation rights are grounded are fulfi lled. 
These aspects will be dealt with below. First, however, two fundamental 
premises of participation should be clarifi ed.
Firstly, the substantive relationship of interested parties to the proce-
dure is the basis for a claim for participation rights; these are, in a sense, 
instrumental to the underlying substantive positions. In other words, the 
ultimate reason for the procedural intervention resides in a particular rela-
tion between the participant to the material situation which motivated the 
procedure. Access is restricted: the entity of reference of this concept of 
participation is not the citizen, nor the public, nor civil society indistinctly, 
but the person situated in a social group or setting which is aff ected by the 
decisional process.52 In short, participation rights should be granted to 
natural and legal persons who are the holders of individual and collective 
interests concerned by the fi nal decision.
Secondly, this defi nition of participation assumes that a clear-cut 
distinction between a negative or subjective function of participation – 
 participation as defence grounded on the person’s dignity – and a positive 
or objective function – participation as collaboration with the deciding 
body – cannot be upheld.53 On the one hand, participation as collabora-
tion entails the protection of the interests voiced in the procedure. On 
the other, when intervening to defend his interests, the participant col-
laborates in the decision-making process by providing information and 
51 While these are the rationales underlying the Courts’ case law on the right 
to be heard, the Courts’ judgments have coined a restrictive stance regarding par-
ticipation rights, for the reasons pointed out above. Moreover, as stated, they have 
essentially maintained a pragmatic approach, refraining from providing a coherent 
doctrinal basis grounded in these rationales.
52 Distinguishing two systems of representation (representative democracy and 
interest representation) by reference to the citizen and to ‘l’homme situé’ see Jean 
Boulois, ‘Représentation et participation dans la vie politique et administrative’, 
in La participation directe du citoyen à la vie politique et administrative. Travaux 
des XXIes, Journée d’Études Juridiques Jean Dabin (12th) Francis Delpérée (second 
author) Bruylant (Bruxelles, 1986), p. 49, at pp. 50–51.
53 This clear-cut distinction underlies the Court’s judgment in Nölle.
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alternative interpretations of the facts under assessment. Thus, the diff er-
ence between the two functions is not qualitative, but merely quantitative, 
measured in the predominance of one function over the other, which in 
the end depends on the relevance of the personal factor in the underly-
ing material situation.54 In addition, the enhancement of procedural rules 
which are likely to lead to correct outcomes, in so far as they ensure an 
accurate representation of the variables involved in decision-making, is a 
requirement of the rule of law, as is the respect for the person’s dignity. 
Both are essential to the material justice of the fi nal decision, which 
should be ensured beyond the formal correctness of the procedure.55 
Therefore, a clear-cut distinction between the two rationales distorts and 
overly simplifi es the conceptual and eff ective reality of participation. Both 
converge under the same legal principle – the rule of law – and the values 
warranted thereby.
It should, moreover, be noted that the eventual plural confi guration 
of the content of the act resulting from a participative procedure, in the 
sense defended in the above paragraphs, does not in principle imply that 
administrative decisions should be consensual or based on a compromise 
between competing interests, and much less that the administration gives 
away its decision-making powers. While, admittedly, participation might 
lead to compromised solutions, it should strictly serve the functions 
pointed out above. In any event, ‘responsibility [of the administration] for 
the decisions taken must be the limit to participation in the procedure’.56 
Participants are not granted proper decision-making power within the 
decisional structure (at least, not in a legal sense). Their views may be 
taken into consideration, but the fi nal act adopted does not need to mirror 
the interests voiced in the procedure.
54 As underlined by Cassese, the ‘non-unity’ of the theme of participation 
derives from the diversity of the position of the participant in relation to the 
subject matter underlying the procedure ‘sometimes external or marginal to 
the procedure and to the function which the latter performs, sometimes, on the 
contrary, central and dominant’ (Sabino Cassese, ‘Il privato e il procedimento 
amministrativo’, (1970) 79 Archivio Giuridico Filippo Serafi ni 25, at p. 31, author’s 
translation).
55 David Duarte, Procedimentalização, participação e fundamentação: para 
uma concretização do princípio da imparcialidade administrativa como parâmetro 
decisório, Almedina (Coimbra, 1996), pp. 137–139, and, further, p. 166. 
Nevertheless, it is not ruled out that the quantitative diff erence may infl uence the 
content of participation (Craig, Administrative Law, cit. (n. 30), pp. 408–409 and 
429–431).
56 Vasco Pereira da Silva, Em busca do acto administrativo perdido, Almedina 
(Coimbra, 1996), pp. 403–404.
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4.2.  Two Variables: Types of Power and Aff ected Interests
It follows from the considerations presented above that the normative 
justifi cation for participation rights depends on the convergence of two 
factors: there must be public interference in the legal sphere of legal or 
natural persons and a correlative change in these persons’ advantageous or 
disadvantageous positions stemming from a public action. In other words, 
participation rights are justifi ed where the regulatory activity of the Union 
institutions and bodies amounts to shaping administrative relationships 
between public and private entities, in the sense that they either defi ne or 
decisively determine the content of the rights, interests, duties and charges 
recognised to or impinging upon the persons concerned.
The concept of administrative relationship, in the meaning conveyed 
here, encompasses the links established between diff erent legal spheres, 
involving both public entities and natural and legal persons, creating or 
aff ecting rights, interests, charges and duties which emerge from the legal 
norms applicable to a certain material situation. They often involve more 
than two persons, in interrelated sets of favourable and unfavourable posi-
tions (complex administrative relationships), be they of a substantive or 
procedural nature.57
4.2.1.  Types of power
The line dividing the type of power exerted which gives rise to the right 
to be heard is not so much that which distinguishes between discretion-
ary and mandatory powers, as the Court of First Instance has held in 
recent controversial judgments.58 The decisive criterion is the end result 
of the administrative decision: whether it may or may not determine an 
advantageous or disadvantageous position for the persons concerned, for 
example, whether it may negatively impact on their fundamental rights or 
on previously recognised rights and legally protected interests, by restrict-
ing, suspending or extinguishing them, or whether it may constitute an 
onus in their regard or deny them a benefi t sought. While the impact and 
meaning of participation may be diff erent before the exercise of discretion-
ary or of mandatory powers, the rationales underlying rights of participa-
tion are equally valid in both cases. Arguing that participation is relevant 
57 On the concept of complex administrative relationships see Eberhard 
Schmidt-Assmann, La teoría general del derecho amministrativo como sistema, 
Marcial Pons (Madrid, 2003), pp. 25, 185 and 316; on procedural administrative 
relationship, idem, pp. 375–376.
58 Yusuf, cit., paras 326 to 329 and Kadi, cit., paras 254 to 259 (both pending 
appeal).
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only in the face of the exercise of a discretionary choice, in so far as it 
contributes towards structuring the process of deciding which solution is 
best compatible with the public interest, implies debasing the dignitarian 
rationale which underpins a ‘stronger’ meaning of participation. Further, 
even if one attributes a prevailing weight to the instrumental rationale of 
participation, participation is equally relevant where the decision-maker’s 
choice is bound by objective parameters (i.e. the decision does not result 
from a discretionary appreciation, in a narrow sense) but the fi nal decision 
entails nonetheless an assessment of technical or specialised knowledge.59 
Lastly, and still under an eminently instrumental logic, even in cases of 
mandatory powers, the facts on the basis of which the administration 
decides may be controversial, the intervention of the persons aff ected in 
order better to defi ne the issue under appraisal being useful.
Now, such powers may be manifested both through the enactment of an 
individual decision and through the adoption of a rule. First, the distinc-
tion between individual and general acts is far from clear, unless based on 
legal fi ctions.60 In fact, the exertion of normative power conveys ‘extremely 
59 This recalls the distinction between discretionary powers proper and techni-
cal discretionarity. On this distinction see, among others, Bernardo Mattarella, 
‘Discrezionalità amministrativa’, in Cassese (ed.), Dizionario di Diritto Pubblico, 
cit. (n. 21), vol. III, p. 1993, at p. 1006.
60 In EU law, take the example of anti-dumping regulations, of regulations 
which defi ne the list of tradable products attesting to their compatibility with 
public health rules, or of the recent regulations adopting measures directed against 
the property of persons suspected of terrorist association. The fi rst have been 
characterised as having a hybrid nature (in particular, the Opinion of AG Warner, 
quoted above, n. 35). The second may be considered general administrative acts: 
they are concrete, given that they refer to specifi c products and defi ne their ‘legal 
status’, but general in eff ect, in so far as they defi ne the conditions of use that 
must be abided by market operators dealing with them (on general administrative 
acts, referring to Italian administrative law, see Massimo Severo Giannini, Diritto 
amministrativo, 3rd edition, Giuff rè (Milan, 1993), vol. II, p. 288; they resemble the 
décisions d’espèce of French administrative law: see Réné Chapus, Droit adminis-
trative général, Monchrestien (Paris, 2008), pp. 516–522). Arguably, in the third 
case, administrative acts are adopted in the form of a regulation (the type of situa-
tion envisaged in Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty). The Court of First Instance pro-
vided a diff erent interpretation. It considered that the fact that the persons named 
on the regulation ‘appear to be’ directly and individually concerned by it does not 
aff ect the general nature of the act, which determines an erga omnes prohibition on 
funding or making economic resources available to the persons named in the regu-
lation (Yusuf, cit. (n. 28), para. 186), and overlooked the fact that the regulation in 
issue also determined that all funds and economic resources of the persons named 
in the regualtion’s annex should be frozen (see paras 185 to 188 of the judgment). 
This interpretation was upheld by the Court of Justice (Kadi and Al Barakaat, cit., 
n. 28, paragraph 242).
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varied contents, of atypical symbolic expression (plans, graphs, chemical 
or mathematical formulae, etc.) and of varied subjective range’, often blur-
ring the distinction between the norm and the act that implements it.61 At 
the very least, one may maintain that there are diff erent shades of general 
and abstract characteristics of regulations. Secondly, and consequently, 
acts of a general nature may impact on private legal spheres in a similar 
way to individual acts. Independently of the possibility of an administra-
tive act being adopted under the form of a regulation, the regulation may 
intensively defi ne the contours of the material situation in such a way as to 
decisively condition the content of the administrative relationships which 
will for part of its realm.62
4.2.2. Aff ected interests
As stated, the recognition of rights of participation needs to be related 
to the position of the individuals vis-à-vis the administrative decision. 
The concept of administrative relationship helps to delimit the range of 
persons who may be granted access to the procedure. On a fi rst approach, 
these are all those who are somehow implicated in the administrative 
relationship which emerges from the public intervention. Two groups of 
interested persons should be distinguished: fi rst, persons whose subjective 
rights and interests are directly aff ected by the outcome of the procedure, 
who can generally be termed holders of legitimate interests. Their access 
to the procedure is not strictly dependent on the ‘ownership’ of a right, 
or on a norm which is intended legally to protect the relevant interests of 
persons.63 More broadly, holders of legitimate interests are those whose 
legal sphere may be aff ected by the outcome of the procedure and whose 
legal position is protected and needs to be taken into consideration by the 
legal system, it being thus legally relevant.64 The second group consists of 
persons who voice interests protected by the legal system which, by force 
of the applicable legal norms, are pertinent to the regulation of the mate-
rial situation under analysis, that is, holders of general interests. In this 
case, the interests voiced by participants are legally relevant in so far as 
their fulfi lment is, in general, one of the goals of the legal system and, in 
61 Juan Alfonso Santamaria Pastor, Fundamentos de derecho administrativo, 
Ramon Areces (Madrid, 1988), vol. I, p. 712.
62 Craig, EU Administrative Law, cit. (n.17), pp. 319–321.
63 This last statement recalls the German doctrine of the protection norm: 
Schmidt-Assmann, cit., pp. 86–88.
64 This notion derives from the concept of legitimate interest developed in 
Italian administrative law (Aldo Sandulli, Manuale di Diritto Amministrativo, XV 
edition, Jovene Editore (Naples, 1987), pp. 107–114).
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particular, of the pertinent rules and, thus, should be taken into account 
in the exercise of the administrative function. This embraces holders of 
diff use interests, who may be individuals who have a certain relation of 
proximity with the subject matter in issue, or, more frequently, collective 
persons who are statutorily representative of these interests.65
Representatives of collective interests may be included in one or the 
other category, depending on their connection to the material situation: 
whether they intervene to represent the rights or to voice the interests of 
their associates who are directly implicated in the regulated matter,66 or 
whether they intervene because the interests that they represent are con-
cerned by the matter being decided and, by force of the relevant legal rules, 
should be taken into consideration in the decision or rule adopted. In this 
role, in current EU governance arrangements, they are often associated 
to decisional procedures, but their ability to intervene depends essentially 
on the volition of the deciding body, not on a procedural rule of action 
imposed grounded on their relation to the material situation.67
4.2.3.  Procedural status
The procedural status of participants or, more precisely, the procedural 
guarantees ancillary to their right to participate are diff erent in the two 
65 In essence, these correspond to the doctrinal categories of legitimate interest 
and factual interest which have been developed in the Italian administrative doc-
trine. On this see Sandulli, cit., pp. 104–114 and Giannini, cit., pp. 74–87. There 
has been a long dispute on the boundaries between them (among others, Leonardo 
Ferrara, ‘Situazioni soggettive nei confronti della pubblica amministrazione’ in 
Cassese (ed), Dizionario di Diritto Pubblico, cit., vol. VI, pp. 5376–5390; Mario 
Nigro, ‘Ma che cos’è questo interesse legittimo? Interrogativi vecchi e nuovi punti 
di rifl essione’, [1987] Il foro italiano, 469–483) and, in particular, on where to place 
diff use interests in this construction. It is not rarely that the Community Courts 
have resorted to categories of national law to develop European normative solu-
tions. See, for example, Pierre Pescatore, ‘Le recours dans la jurisprudence de 
la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes a des normes déduites de la 
comparaison des droits des États membres’ (1980) 32 Revue Internationale de Droit 
Comparé 337. The author underlines that the Courts’ comparative approach leads 
sometimes to the absorption by Community law of legal conceptions of a single 
Member State, given ‘their evident utility or the judicial progress that they allow to 
accomplish’ (p. 353). In this case, it is submitted that the categories mentioned are 
useful to enhance the procedural protection of private parties. In addition, as will 
be argued below, they are not completely unknown in European law.
66 By analogy with the conditions set by the Courts’ jurisprudence in order 
to consider an association directly and individually concerned, for the pur-
poses of Article 230 (4). See, among others, Case C-78/03 P, Commission v. 
Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum eV [2005] ECR I–10737, at para. 70.
67 See Section 2, above.
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cases. Abstracting from the formal structure of the administrative deci-
sion, and underpinning the analysis of this matter with the concept of 
administrative relationship, holders of legitimate interests, irrespective 
of their quality as addressees of a decision or as so-called ‘third parties’, 
should in principle have a procedural status analogous to the one recog-
nised to those entitled with a right to be heard, as this has been developed 
so far in the jurisprudence, save where a diff erent solution results from 
specifi c legislation or is required by the circumstances of the case. In a 
way, this has been acknowledged by the Courts’ jurisprudence, in cases 
where the right to be heard was, as such, granted to persons other than the 
addressee of a Commission decision. Thus, as mentioned, in Lisrestal the 
argument that the applicable regulation established a direct link between 
the Commission and the recipient of the assistance, beyond the formal 
structure of the procedure, framed the recognition of the right to be heard 
to the latter.68
Nevertheless, this principled claim is at odds with the current legal 
confi guration of European competition law procedures under Regulation 
1/2003. These are fundamentally bilateral procedures.69 Complainants 
who, being holders of legitimate interests, are ‘closely associated with the 
proceedings’70 are not aff orded the same procedural guarantees as those 
entitled to a right to be heard.71 In addition, the approximation between 
the procedural rights of holders of legitimate interests – concretely, the 
68 Lisrestal, cit., para. 47. See also Case T–102/00, Vlaams Fonds voor de 
Sociale Integratie van Personen met een Handicap v. Commission [2003] ECR 
II–2433, at para. 60.
69 Article 27 of Council Regulation 1/2003, of 16 December 2002, on the imple-
mentation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
(OJ (2003) L 1/1). Cf. Articles 6, 11 and 13 of Council Regulation 773/2004, of 7 
April 2004, relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ (2004) L 123/18), as amended.
70 Article 27(1) of Regulation 1/2003, cit. On their qualifi cation as holders of 
legitimate interests, see below.
71 The procedural rules defi ned are clear in this respect: the complainant has 
access only to the non-confi dential part of the statement of objections and may, 
where the Commission fi nds it appropriate, participate in the oral hearing aff orded 
to the parties against whom the procedure was initiated (Article 6 of Regulation 
773/2004, cit., n. 69). The rule that the procedural rights of the complainants are 
not ‘as far-reaching as the right to a fair hearing of the companies which are the 
object of the Commission’s investigation’ has been stated in Joined Cases 142 and 
156/84, British-American Tobacco Company Ltd and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc. 
v. Commission [1987] ECR 4487, at para. 20 (where it is underlined that ‘the limits 
of [rights of complainants] are reached where they begin to interfere with those 
companies’ right to a fair hearing’) and in Case T–17/93, Matra Hachette SA v. 
Commission, [1994] ECR II–595, at paras 34 and 35.
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complainant – and the right to be heard of the addressee of the decision, 
where admitted, has been carefully grounded on the specifi c circumstances 
of the case.72 The assimilation of the participation rights of interested 
parties to the right to be heard of the addressee of an administrative deci-
sion was notably attempted in Sytraval, where the Court of First Instance 
sought to extend the procedural guarantees ancillary to the right to be 
heard to complainants in a state aid procedure. The judgment, however, 
distorted the procedural design determined by the combination of Article 
88(2) and (3) and took the view that the state aid decision at issue had 
been addressed to the complainant. This was an incorrect interpretation, 
based on the will to react to react against an opaque procedure (that of 
Article 88(3)), and was quashed on appeal.73 To conclude this point, the 
‘justice’ of the principled claim espoused above needs to be assessed in 
each case, in the light of the applicable rules and of the factual situation 
under valuation: either of these factors may hinder the extension of the 
procedural guarantees attached to the right to be heard to other parties to 
the proceedings.
As to holders of general interests, they may be aff orded a weaker pro-
cedural position, given the predominance of the instrumental rationale 
underlying participation. In this sense, the deciding body may delimit the 
subject matter in relation to which it hears these interested parties, they 
may not be given access to the non-confi dential part of the fi le and, while 
the statement of reasons must reveal the reasoning and the sources of 
information taken into account by the deciding body, the latter does not 
need to address the specifi c claims voiced by holders of general interests. 
The stronger procedural status of the holders of legitimate interests advo-
cated above lies on the relevance of their personal position in relation to 
the subject matter being decided, since the fi nal decision impinges upon 
their legal sphere, irrespective of its concrete addressee. The circles of 
interests which need to be considered by the decision-maker, the position 
of their holders and their corresponding degree of procedural protection 
result from the principles and norms which regulate the substance of the 
subject matter.
72 Case T–49/93, Société Internationale de Diff usion et d’Edition (SIDE) v. 
Commission [1995] ECR II–2501, at paras. 71 and 73. The Court considered that 
an exchange of views inter partes with the complainant would have been better 
suited to fully ensure the usefulness of the complainant’s contribution to the 
procedure.
73 Case C–367/95 P, Commission v. Sytraval and Brink’s France SARL [1998] 
ECR I–1719.
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4.2.4.  Legitimate interests and general interests in EU law
Admittedly, these categories are not suffi  ciently developed in EU law (cer-
tainly not as general categories, independent of specifi c regulations and 
sector specifi cities), but they are also not unknown in this legal system. 
For example, according to Article 7(2) of Regulation 1/2003, other than 
Member States, only natural or legal persons demonstrating a legitimate 
interest are entitled to fi le a complaint in a competition law procedure. 
The Courts have accorded, for these purposes, a legitimate interest com-
petitors of the undertakings targeted by the procedure, to persons whose 
economic activities may suff er injuries or losses as a result of the alleged 
infringement (including fi nal customers who show that their ‘economic 
interests have been harmed or are likely to be harmed as a result of [a] 
restriction of competition’), to associations of undertakings when the 
interests or their associates may be harmed by the claimed unlawful con-
duct.74 These correspond to the category of holders of legitimate interests 
defi ned above. It should be noted that the quality of complainant may also 
be recognised to interveners in an already initiated procedure: the Court 
of First Instance has held that a diff erent solution would deprive holders 
of legitimate interests of exercising the procedural rights associated with 
the status of complainant.75 This reveals that the underlying concern is not 
to protect the procedural position of the complainant as such, that is, the 
person who triggers the administrative procedure, but of holders of legiti-
mate interests in general, whose protection is granted by aff ording them 
the status of complainants.
On the other hand, other persons showing a ‘suffi  cient interest’ may be 
admitted to the procedure, either upon their own initiative (provided that 
the Commission considers their intervention necessary) or by invitation of 
the Commission.76 For example, ‘consumer associations that apply to be 
heard should generally be regarded as having a suffi  cient interest, where 
the proceedings concern products or services used by the end-consumer 
or products or services that constitute a direct input into such products or 
74 Ignace Maselis and Hans M. Gilliams, ‘Rights of Complainants in 
Community Law’, [1997] European Law Review 103, at p. 108. The possibility 
of fi nal costumers being admitted as complainants was mooted in Joined Cases 
T–213/01 and 214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse v. Commission [2006] ECR 
II–1601, at paras 114 to 119.
75 Joined Cases T–213/01 and 214/01, Österreichische Postsparkasse 
v. Commission [2006] ECR II–1601, at para. 91 (cited n. 74 above). Joined 
Cases T–259–264 and 271/02, Raiff eisen Zentralbank Österreich and Others v. 
Commission, paras 95 to 103.
76 Article 27(3) of Regulation 1/2003, cit. (n. 69), and Article 13 of Regulation 
773/2004, cit. (n. 69).
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services.’77 These interested parties, unlike holders of legitimate interests, 
are not directly implicated in the material situation that gave rise to the 
administrative procedure (for example, their economic interests are not 
aff ected by the infringement of competition rules), but they voice interests 
that are legally relevant in so far as they are protected by the legal system 
and are touched by the administrative procedure at issue.78 Therefore, 
even if the distinction between addressees and complainants is not neces-
sarily defi ned along the lines espoused above, the proposed categorisation 
is grounded solidly in European competition law.
Likewise, the procedure to be followed for the registration of a 
Community trade mark entails, on the one hand, an opposition proce-
dure which may be triggered by holders of legitimate interests whom the 
registration might harm (for example, proprietors of earlier trade marks 
that might be confused with the future trade mark).79 On the other, ‘any 
natural or legal person and any group or body representing manufactur-
ers, producers, suppliers of services, traders or consumers’ – holders of 
general interests that might be concerned by the registration of the trade 
mark – may submit written observations explaining why this registration 
does not comply with the legally defi ned requirements.80 Their procedural 
status is diff erent: in the fi rst situation, opponents are parties to the pro-
ceedings before the Offi  ce for the Harmonisation of the Internal Market; 
in the second case, the observations are simply ‘communicated to the 
applicant who may comment on them’.81
In a similar vein, in anti-dumping procedures, a privileged procedural 
position is accorded to the undertakings concerned that are ‘directly and 
individually’ aff ected by an anti-dumping regulation which entails ‘adverse 
consequences’ for them, and, to a lesser degree, to those demonstrating a 
‘suffi  cient interest as an “interested party”’.82 At the same time, the veri-
fi cation of the condition on which the Community intervention needs to 
77 Regulation 773/2004, cit., recital 11.
78 Cf. Österreichische Postsparkasse, cit. (n. 74), at paras 114 to 119, in particu-
lar para. 115.
79 Articles 42, 43 and 8 of Council Regulation 40/94, of 20 December 1993, on 
the Community trade mark (OJ (1994) L 11/1), as amended.
80 Articles 41 and 7 of Regulation 40/94, cit. (n. 79 above).
81 Cf. Article 41(2) and Article 43 of Regulation 40/94, cit. (n. 79), and Rule 19 
of Commission Regulation 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council 
Regulation 40/94 on the Community trade mark, OJ 1995 L 303/1.
82 Al-Jubail, cit. (n. 35), at para. 15; Nölle, cit. (n. 20), at para. 76; Articles 
5(9) to (11), 6(5) to (7) and 20 of Regulation 384/96, of 22 December 1995, on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Community, OJ (1996) L 56/1.
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be based – whether or not the imposition of anti-dumping measures is in 
the Community interest – is determined on the basis of ‘an appreciation 
of all the various interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the 
domestic industry and users and consumers’.83 For this purpose, inter-
ested parties, independently of a direct and individual concern, are given 
the opportunity to express their views on this issue (they may request a 
hearing upon justifi cation).84 This right to participate in order to deter-
mine Community interest corresponds to the rights of participation of 
holders of general interests espoused above.
Access to the decisional procedures of holders of legitimate and of 
general interests may be extended by analogy to other fi elds of European 
law, where the Community decision is such that it originates or aff ects an 
administrative relationship established between the European administra-
tion and the persons concerned, irrespective of the form it takes. This may 
occur both when the fi nal decision results from a centralised administra-
tive procedure (i.e. those where the fi nal act is formally and substantively 
taken by a Community institution, irrespective of the collaboration and 
intervention of national administrative bodies and entities) and when it 
stems from a decentralised procedure (i.e. a procedure that is started and 
concluded by a national administration; this last is the face of a network 
which involves the other national administrations, the Commission and, 
possibly, other Community administrative bodies whose contributions are 
decisive for the fi nal outcome).
While one may argue that this wide scope of rights of participation, 
as far as holders of legitimate interests are concerned, results from the 
broadest judicial formulation of the right to be heard (according to which 
it is granted to natural or legal persons in relation to measures adversely 
aff ecting them), as stated, this is very much embedded in a adversarial 
understanding of the administrative procedure. This leads to a narrower 
scope and meaning of rights of participation than the one propounded 
in this chapter, and to their denial in circumstances where they should in 
principle be recognised, in the light of a conception of participation rights 
grounded in the concept of administrative relationship, of the reality of 
public interference in subjective legal spheres, and of the legal relevance 
of participation when seen essentially from an instrumental perspective. 
83 Article 21(1) of Regulation 384/96, cit. (n. 82 above). Cf. Articles 7(1) and 
9(4) of the same regulation.
84 Article 21(2) and (3) of Regulation 384/96, cit. (n. 82). Case C–179/89, 
Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs v. Commission [1991] ECR I–5709, 
at para. 28 (denying interested parties not directly and individually concerned 
access to the non-confi dential fi le).
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In addition, even in its broader formulation, the right to be heard, in its 
current state of development, does not entail the possibility of recognising 
procedural guarantees of intervention to holders of general interests.
In the light of the construction proposed in this chapter, in the adminis-
trative procedure which leads to the authorisation to use smoke fl avourings 
in or on food, food business operators, other than the person who initiated 
the procedure and who will possibly hold the authorisation, should be 
granted a right to participate, since, under the applicable regulation, they 
will need to comply with the conditions and restrictions attached to the 
authorisation in question.85 Their legitimate interests should, therefore, 
be taken into account by the deciding body. Similarly, where Community 
legislation determines that a public consultation should be held in a given 
decisional process, diff erent procedural treatment should be given to 
holders of legitimate interests and to holders of general interests, along the 
lines espoused above, in so far as it is possible to distinguish them on the 
basis of the respective contributions and, in particular, of the arguments 
woven by those who claim a legitimate interest. This would thicken (or 
create) the procedural guarantees of interested parties, apparently unac-
counted for under the vague wording of the norms providing for a public 
inquiry.86
To be sure, participation rights are not unlimited. They cede before 
the need to respect fundamental rights upheld by the legal system (for 
example, professional secrecy) and the need to ensure prompt and eff ec-
tive action when this is required by the protection of the public interest 
(for example, emergency situations).87 Both limits need to be justifi ed and 
fettered by legal principles. For example, regarding the failure to observe 
the rights of the defence regarding measures adopted to control foot-and-
mouth disease, the Court has held that eventual restrictions need to ‘corre-
spond to objectives of general interest pursued by the measure in question’ 
and should not ‘constitute, with regard to the objectives pursued, a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the 
very substance of the rights guaranteed’.88 This limit is certainly stricter 
85 Article 9(4) of Regulation 2065/2003, cit. (n. 40).
86 E.g. ‘[t]he public may make comments to the Commission within 30 days 
from such publication’ (Article 6(7) of Regulation 1829/2003, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003, on genetically modifi ed food 
and feed, OJ (2003) L 268/1.
87 See, respectively Article 16 of Regulation 773/2004, cit. (n. 69), and 
Case C–28/05, G.J. Dokter and others v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en 
Voedselkwaliteit, [2006] ECR I–5431, paras 75–78.
88 Dokter, cit. (n. 87 above), at para. 75. In particular, interested parties should be 
given a right to contest the adopted measure in subsequent proceedings (para. 76).
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in the presence of fundamental rights (for example, measures aff ecting the 
liberty, the property or the good name of a person) than in the presence of 
legitimate interests, and is more meaningful in these cases than in relation 
to the participation rights of holders of general interests. In other words, 
the limits to the relative nature of participation rights are much stronger 
when the protection of fundamental rights is at stake.
As for the consequences of enlarging access to decisional procedures on 
the grounds defended in this chapter, although ideally holders of legiti-
mate interests should be aff orded locus standi to challenge decisions which, 
aff ecting them, have infringed rules of procedure and, in particular, their 
own procedural guarantees, it is well known that the requirement of direct 
and individual concern of Article 230(4), as it has been interpreted by the 
Courts, raises obstacles to this enlargement of locus standi. It could be 
argued that, despite the interconnections between access to procedure and 
access to judicial review, there is no need for the former to be conditioned 
by the latter. One could maintain that broader access to the decisional 
procedure, grounded on the enhancement of the procedural conditions for 
material justice, need not be matched by similar rules of standing directed 
at ensuring the observance of the law in the interpretation and application 
of the Treaty.89 Admittedly, however, loosening the entitlement of partici-
pation rights would create a tension on the European legal system, strain-
ing the limits of standing. In this light, the Courts’ stance can undoubtedly 
be said to have a formal justifi cation. Nevertheless, in the face of the 
considerations put forward in this chapter, one may question whether that 
tension is not already a reality, adding to the widely discussed reasons for 
enlarging the access of non-privileged applicants.90
5.  CONCLUSION
Returning to the meanings of participation presented in this chapter, 
consideration for the dignity of the persons aff ected by Community action 
is perhaps the element which has had least attention in the midst of the 
European governance developments and, at the same time, the element 
which is capable of grounding stricter forms of participation rights in a 
89 Article 220 EC.
90 Among others, Anthony Arnull, ‘Private Applicants and the Action for 
Annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty’, (1995) Common Market Law 
Review, vol. 32, Issue 1 7; Albertina Albors-Llorens, ‘The Standing of Private 
Parties to Challenge Community Measures: has the European Court Missed the 
Boat?’, [2003] Cambridge Law Journal 72.
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large segment of European decision-making. The increased resort to par-
ticipation in European governance arrangements, grounded essentially on 
the instrumental advantages of participation, contrasts with the lack of 
concern for the position of the person aff ected in his rights and interests by 
the regulatory measures adopted by European institutions. On the other 
hand, the Courts’ position in relation to participation rights is excessively 
restrictive to account for the procedural protection of the interests of the 
person touched by decisional processes.
A concept of participation underpinned, concomitantly, by the dignitar-
ian (referring to the fundamental dignity of the person) and by the instru-
mental functions of the procedural intervention of persons concerned, 
and framed by the concept of the administrative relationship, has the 
advantages of extending the procedural protection of the persons whose 
legal sphere is aff ected by Community action and, consequently, of bridg-
ing the distance between the confi guration of participation in the political 
realm, on the one hand, and legal realm, on the other. Consequently, the 
EU administrative legal system will better suit the requirements of the rule 
of law, in so far as the conditions for materially achieving just decisions 
are enhanced. In addition, this would enhance a paradigm of adminis-
trative law that is respectful of the rights and legitimate interests of the 
citizens and more consonant with constitutional features of the EU such 
as direct eff ect, respect for fundamental rights and the status of European 
citizenship.
While the Courts have grounded the right to be heard on the two 
rationales of participation mentioned, their approach has been inconsist-
ent: on the one hand, they have been biased by an adversarial conception 
of procedures and process rights, and, on the other, limited by the limits 
to standing while, at the same time (on occasion, admittedly), they have 
been aware of both the moral imperative and instrumental usefulness of 
participation.
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